Returning to a discussion of operationalization, the transfer/spending measure labeled "unemployment Insurance" in the text of this manuscript includes only those line items included in item 4 above, all unemployment insurance compensation. Second, the transfer/spending measure I label as "public medical care" in the text includes only those line items listed in item 2 above, all medical benefits. Lastly, the transfer/spending category I refer to as "income maintenance" in the text includes those programs listed in item 3 above, all income maintenance benefits. Each of these three sub-categories are mutually exclusive and the aggregate "total transfers" measure is equal to the sum of items 1-7 above. This means that the "total transfers" measure is greater than the sum of the three sub-category measures examined. Each of these four independent variable transfer measures (total, unemployment, medical, and income maintenance) represent the (per capita real) value of direct transfers received by individuals in a state-year, from any government source, be it local, state, or federal.
These measures are also distinct from the "total government spending" measure included in the final model presented in column 6 of Tables A1 and A2. This "total spending" measure includes all government expenditures by state and local governments, as published in the US Census Bureau State Government Finances (https://www.census.gov/govs/state/). This measure includes all outlays in the form of (1) intergovernmental expenditures or transfers, (2) general expenditures (on education, public welfare, hospitals, health, highways, police protection, corrections facilities, natural resources, parks and recreation, government administration, interest on debt, and other or unallocable direct expenditures), (3) utility expenditure, (4) liquor store expenditure, and lastly (5) insurance trust expenditures. This independent variable expenditure measure represents the total value of all expenditures by state and local governments (in real per capita dollars) in a state-year.
Measurement of Social Capital
I have not disaggregated the social capital measure to examine support for the multiple causal mechanisms that I offer in the paper. I have not done this for two reasons: one empirical and one theoretical. First, it is not possible to decompose the measure because I do not have access to the component parts of the social capital factor as estimated by Hawes, Rocha and Meier (2013) , because the data used in this estimation is proprietary. Second, for theoretical reasons, I am hesitant to consider the component parts of the social capital measure independently. Being a latent phenomenon, social capital is more than the sum of its parts. It is not only the cumulation of volunteering activity, charitable giving, or organizational participation. Rather, social capital is the latent propensity for cooperation and supporting norms of interaction, which manifests in these observable behaviors. Puntscher et al. (2016) and Paldam (2000) offer some excellent discussion and analysis of measurement theory on social capital, related to this point.
Possible Reverse Causality
Economic conditions may threaten valid inference in this analysis by influencing both social capital and social welfare spending. Recognizing the possibility that economic insecurity ( " ) might have predictive power over these independent variables (social capital and/or social spending) implies a system of simultaneous equations like the following: " = % + "(% + % " + + " + ⋯ + %"
(1)
Unfortunately, this kind of endogeneity, or "feedback," is a threat to any cross-sectional time-series analysis of observational analysis; it is omnipresent in political economy. Failing to account for this dependence violates OLS assumptions (as well as the assumptions of many other estimators) yielding inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest in equation (1). The problem of identification must be dealt with before estimation of coefficients. Solutions to the identification problem include two-stage least squares, instrumental variables, or generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation (Greene 2012) . However, neither an instrumental variables design nor a two-stage least squares approach are feasible in this application, due to the absence of out-of-sample instruments satisfying relevance and orthogonality assumptions.
An instrumental variables design, using the number of non-profit organizations, for example, is not feasible due to the following reasons.
• First, the number of non-profit organizations in a state is included in the measurement of social capital. But even if it were not in this operationalization, using this, or any other measure of civic, voluntary, or charitable activity, or almost any other policy/political variable in a state as an instrumental variable, would violate at least one of the necessary assumptions in a two stage least squares research design. For valid inference, an instrumental variable ( 3 ) must first be uncorrelated with the error term in the first stage model, 3 . It is almost certain that there exist unobserved covariates of both non-profit organization activity economic insecurity, thereby violating this assumption.
• Second, the correlation between the instrument ( 3 ) and the endogenous regressor ( 3 ) must approach zero as approaches infinity. Again, in this specific case, this is unlikely, as there is ample theory suggesting a nonzero covariance between social capital and non-profit activity (indeed the theory I offer in this paper would imply a correlation between these two factors).
• Lastly, the model specification used for my analyses address a concern about temporal feedback. By lagging the key independent variables by one year, I have some confidence that the estimated effects respect temporal order. Further, a Granger causality test indicates a significant instantaneous feedback and Granger causation of social capital on economic insecurity, but does not indicate a significant instantaneous feedback or Granger causation of economic insecurity on social capital (Geweke, 1982) . Empirically, there is no evidence for a significant feedback effect of economic insecurity on social capital in these data.
The unavailability of an instrumental variables design is the driving reason for my estimation strategy in: (a) selecting a GMM model (the Arellano-Bond estimator, which exploits within-sample "instruments" to produce unbiased and consistent estimates, but also produces heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors to account for unobserved panel-level effects) and (b) lagging the right-hand side variables.
Having highlighted the advantages of this estimator, perhaps it's not sufficiently convincing to defer to the statistical properties of the estimator to alleviate endogneity concerns, so, let's go further. For consistent efficient estimation of % and + (and the respective standard errors) in equation (1), it needs to be demonstrated that ( " ) is strongly exogenous to models of both " and " , equations (2) and (3) respectively. First, modeling " and " as predetermined variables minimally ensures weak exogeneity (Greene 2012 )-I have lagged relevant independent variables in my models to meet this criterion. So, now we have a system of equations:
"(% = + + " + + "(% + ⋯ + +"
"(% = 0 + % "(% + + " + ⋯ + 0"
Second, if it can be shown that economic insecurity ( " ) does not "Granger-cause" "(% or "(% , then economic insecurity is strongly exogenous to equations (5) and (6) and we can be confident about statistical inference with respect to % and + (and their respective standard errors) in equation (4) (Geweke 1982 , Greene 2012 Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) . In the table below, I report the p-value for the ̅ 8 test statistic of the null hypothesis that economic insecurity (specified as Δ " because the lagged dependent variable is included in (4)) does not Grangercause the independent variables included in tables A1 and A2 of the manuscript (characterized as "(% or "(% above, these are lagged social capital, lagged total transfer spending, lagged unemployment insurance transfers, lagged public medical care spending, and lagged income maintenance transfers). I report the ̅ 8 test statistic p-value in favor of the ̅ statistic because the former is more appropriate for series with relatively small T and large N (Lopez and Weber 2017) , as are the data in this analysis. The test statistics reported here are calculated by selecting the number of lags to include by minimizing the average HannanQuinn information criterion.
Table A1: Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results
Given the results in Table A1 , I conclude that any feedback of economic insecurity on social capital, total transfers, public medical care transfers, and income maintenance transfers is not significant. Thus, for these measures, I conclude that economic insecurity is strongly exogenous to models of these independent variables, and therefore does not pose a threat to valid inference with respect to estimation of parameters of interest in equation (4). This provides confidence in the validity of the results reported in the manuscript.
However, the same cannot be said for the relationship between economic insecurity and unemployment insurance transfers, as evidenced by the p-value of 0.000 in the table above. The results in Table A1 report tests of the null hypothesis that economic insecurity does not Granger-cause spending, with the alternative hypothesis that economic insecurity does Granger-cause spending in at least one panel (i.e. state). So, to unpack what's going on here, I tested this assumption of exogeneity with each state series separately. If the results reported in the manuscript are robust when the offending state series are excluded, I would assert confidence in the validity of the results. Tables A2 and A3 (below) replicate the models presented in the manuscript, while omitting the states identified in List B above. As you can see by comparing the magnitude, sign, and significance of the coefficients for each of the key independent variables with the tables reported in the manuscript, the results hold. Despite cutting the sample in half by excluding the 24 states in which economic insecurity is shown to Granger-cause lagged unemployment insurance spending, the substantive implications from these models are not different than those reported for the entire sample. I therefore have confidence in the results reported in the manuscript; endogeneity of this variety (i.e., reverse causality or feedback) is not a severe problem and does not bias the substantive or statistical inferences I draw from the analysis.
To be clear, there is theoretical reason to argue that economic conditions may shape the development or demonstration of social capital, and this might influence long and short term social welfare spending or institutions. However, as an empirical matter, this is not a threat to validity in this paper. The threat of this feedback mechanism has been addressed here with specification decisions (lagged independent and dependent variables) and with a conservative choice of estimator. Examining these feedback mechanisms with respect to both policy and social institution building are important questions for future research, and doing so would require a different research design and a very different model specification. 
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